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TRACY-COLLINS TRUST COMpANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
FRANCIS BOYDELL GOELTZ, a
single man,
Defendant,

Case No. 8476

and

MARIAN STORY GOELTZ, a single
woman,
Defendant and Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent in order to amplify and make more definite certain facts of this case presents the following
supplemental Statement of Facts:
1. Status of title of mortgaged premises from the
year 1936 to the year 1952.
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

(a) The defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, and
the defendant and appellant, 1\{arian Story Goeltz, were
husband and wife on July 30, 1936 (date of deed from
the Bronsons to Mr. and Mrs. Goeltz), on October 27,
1936 (date of execution of the 1936 mortgage owned and
held by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.), and on May
10, 1948 (date of 1948 mortgage involved in this action)
(Exhibit 2 P, Entries 54, 55, 65; Appellant's Answer and
Counterclaim, par. 2 of Second Defense; R. 12 ;) Appellant's Answer to Supplemental Complaint, pars. 3 and 4,
R. 50, R. 153).
(b) Francis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant were divorced by decree of Third Judicial District Court dated
March 31, 1952 (Exhibit 2 P, Entries 77-80). They were
thereafter remarried and were again divorced by decree
of said Court dated January 15, (Ex. 2 P, Entries
82, 83).
(c) Francis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant obtained
title .as joint tenants to the mortgaged pren1ises by virtue
of a Warranty deed dated July 30, 1936, executed by ~f.
J. Bronson and Alice 0. Bronson, his wife, as grantors.
This deed was recorded in the office of the Recorder
of Salt Lake County, Utah, on July 31, 1936 (Ex. 2 P,
Entry 54; Ex. 3 P).
(d) F·rancis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant owned
the mortgaged premises as joint tenants on October 27,
1936, the date of 1936 mortgage o'vned and held by
Pacific Mutual Life Insuranee Co. (Ex. 2 P, Entry 55;
Ex. 4 P).
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(e) Francis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant owned the
mortgaged premises as joint tenants on May 10, 1948,
date of 1948 mortgage involved in this action (Ex. 2· P,
Entry 65).
(f) Pursuant to said deeree of the 'Third District
Court dated March 31, 1952 (Ex. 2 P, Entries 77-80)
Fr.ancis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant on April 30, 1952,
quit claimed the mortgaged premises to one Elise Davis
(Ex. 2 P, Entry 70, Ex. 7 P) who in turn on April 30,
1952 quit claimed the same to Appellant (Ex. 2 P, Entry
71, Ex. 87). Therefore, from date of acquisition of title
from the Bronsons on July 30, 1936, to March 31, 1952
(date of court decree aforesaid) a period of 15 years and
8 months, the title to the n1ortgaged premises stood on
the public records of Salt Lake County, Utah, in the
names of Francis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant as joint
tenants (Ex. 2 P, Entries 54, 55, 65, 67, 70, 71, 77-80).

2. History of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.
1936 mortgage.
(a) This mortgage was dated October 27, 1936, and
was executed by Fr.ancis Boydell Goeltz and Appellant,
husband and wife, in favor of Respondent (Ex. 13 P and
Ex. 4 P). It secured a promissory note signed by Francis
Boydell Goeltz and Appellant in the principal amount of
$6,000.00 (Ex. 22 P). The Appellant admitted the execution of this note and mortgage - they were produced
by her on demand of Respondent - and she admitted the
genuineness of her signatures thereon (Appellant's
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Answer to Respondent's Supplemental Complaint, par 4;
R. 147; R. 100, 101, 102).
(b) This mortgage was assigned by Respondent to
The RF·C Mortgage Co. on May 5, 1937, by written assignment bearing said date (Ex. 2 P, Entry 56; Ex. 5 P).
(c) The RFC Mortgage Company assigned this
mortgage to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. by assignment dated June 21,1938 (Ex. 2 P, Entry 60; Ex. 6 P).
(d) Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. was the
owner of this mortgage on May 10, 1948. The balance
due on same amounted to the sum of $3,224.41 (Exs. 16 P,
18 P, 14 P; R. 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 107, 108). This amount
was paid by Respondent to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company, (Ex. 14 P, R. 76, 77, 106, 107) and the payment was part of the 1948 loan in original principal
amount of $7,100.00 (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 26 D, 27 D; R. 76,
77, 106, 107). The balance of the amount then due on the
original $7,100.00 mortgage in the sum of $3,851.60 was
paid to Francis Boydell Goeltz (Ex. 15 P; R. 76, R. 108).
3. Negotiation of 1948 Mortgage loan.

With respect to the 1948 loan Francis Boydell Goeltz,
talked with Henry E. Ogaard, Secretary of Respondent
about May 10, 1948 (R. 79). In the conversation Mr.
Goeltz stated that "he vvould like to borrow more money
for the purpose of ren1odeling the hon1e." Ogaard explained to hiln that the· only w,ay it could be done would
be for Respondent to make a new loan and pay off the
old loan - referring to the 1936 n1ortgage then o'vned
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
by Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. (R. 79, 80). Respondent could not have made a new loan without paying
the Pacific Mutual Mortgage (R. 81). Francis Boydell
Goeltz has admitted of record that he exeeuted and
delivered to Respondent the 1948 note and mortgage for
a good and valuable consideration (Answer of Francis
Boydell Goeltz, R. 19, 20).

RESPONDENT'S ARGUMENT
Respondent believes that it can more effectively submit its argument in opposition to that of Appellant by
dividing its presentation into two principal parts. Part
A will discuss the legal issues involved in this appeal
in an affirmative manner setting forth Respondent's
theories of the case and demonstrating their validity in
sustaining the judgment of the trial court. Part B will
analyze the legal authorities cited by Appellant and
demonstrate their inapplicability and the erroneous conclusions of Appellant.

PART A

RESPONDENT'S CA'SE AND DEMONSTRATION OF
VALDITY OF JUDGMENT
POINT I.
THE MORTGAGE DATED MAY 10, 1948 (Ex. lOP) IS
EFFECTUAL TO BIND THE INTEREST OF DEFENDANT,
FRANCIS BO·YDELL GOELTZ, IN THE PREMISES DESCRIBED THEREIN AS IT EXISTED ON THE DATE OF
EXECUTION O:F SAID MORTGAGE BY SAID DEFENDANT.
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1. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On the date of the execution of the mortgage dated
May 10, 1948, the Appellant and Francis Boydell Goeltz
were then husband· and wife ,and owned the mortgaged
premises in fee simple as joint tenants and not as tenants
in common. (Ex. 3 P-Bronson deed); Ex. 2 P (Abstract
of Title Ex. 2 P) ). Francis Boydell Goeltz, admits that
he executed said mortgage dated May 10, 1948 (Ex.lO P)
and the promissory note secured by said mortgage (Ex.
9 P) ,and the agreement (Ex. 11 P) (Answer of defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz).

2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
(a) A joint tenant rnay sell and convey his interest in real property held in joint tenancy to
a stranger and such conveyance will result in
a severance or termination of the joint
tenancy alld the creation of a tenancy in
common between the stranger and the rernaining or·iginal owner of the property.
See con1plete .annotation in 129 A.L.R. 814.
Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.)
Vol. 4, pg. 317, Sec. 1780.
Schwartzbaugh vs. Sampson, 11 Cal. App.
(2d) ±51, 5-± p 2d. 73;
Smith vs. Sn1ith, 290 Mich. 143; 287 N.W.
411; 129 A.L.R. 215;
Coff vs. Y oun1an, 237 Wis. 643; 298 N.W.
179 ; 134 A.L.R. 952 ;
Lawler vs. Byrne, 252 Ill. 194; 96 N.E. 892.
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"A joint tenancy may be servered, either
voluntarily, as by partition of the property, or a
conveyance of the interest of any joint tenant, or
involuntarily, as by an execution s.ale of any interest that is subject thereto. IJiowever, the mere
docketing of a judgment against a joint tenant
even though a lien results therefrom, does not
result in a severance of a joint estate.t Whenever
such severance takes place the joint tenancy terminates and the right of survivorship is destroyed.
A third person to whon1 a joint tenant conveys his
interest holds it as tenant in common with the
other owners, for the rule is that anything which
destroys the unity of possession will turn the
interest servered from the others into a tenancy
in common as regards to remaining joint tenants * * *."
(14 Am. Jur., Co-tenancy, Sec. 14, pg. 86).
(b) A joint tenant of real estate has a right

to mortgage his interest in the property
without either the knowledge or consent
of the co-owner.
"A joint owner of real estate has a right to
mortgage his interest in the property without
either the knowledge or consent of his co-owner. A
party who holds a deed of trust or lien against the
joint owners' undivided interest in real estate has
a right to foreclose his lien on the· debtor's interest
in the real property. -where joint tenants have
executed a deed of trust or lien to secure the individual debt of one of the joint ovvners, in a foreclosure proceeding, the joint owners h,ave the
right to require the interest of the party who is
primarily liable for the debt to be sold before their
interest in the property is offered for sale. Any
interest in real estate which a person may sell and
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convey he may also mortgage. The joint tenancy
is severed by the mortgage, at any rate for the
time being, and until it is paid or redeemed."
(Thompson on Real Property (Perm. Ed.)
Vol. 4, pg. 4, pg. 317, Sec. 1782).
"A mortgage or pledge of the joint property
is not binding on the co-tenants who do not join
in its execution, unless by reason of their knowledge and acquiescence they are estopped to deny
its validity; and a ratification by such co-tenants
will not relate back so as to give the mortgage
validity to the prejudice of other creditors. Such
a mortgage will bind the share or interest of the
joint tenant who has executed the mortgage. The
undivided interest of a joint tenant may be made
the subject of a n~ortgage by him without the consent or concurrence of his co-tenants and to the
extent of the mortgage lien the·· right of the survivors will be destroyed or suspended and the
equity of rede1nption at the death of the mortgagor tenant will be all that will fall to his surviving co-tenants." (Emphasis supplied.)
( 48 C. J. Sec., Joint Tenancies, Sec. 16, pg.

936);
2 American Law of Property (1952), Sec. 6.10

10;
Joint Tenancies (Ogden), Proceedings of
Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust La,v (1952) of A B A at pages
17, 18 and 19.
(c) In states where a nzortgage creates a
lien, the execution and delivery of a
mortgage by a joint tenant covering his
~interest in real property effects a severa,nce and a tenancy in con~mon is created
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to the extent of the mortgage lien, and
to this extent the right of the survivor is
distroyed or s1tspended and the right of
redemption at the death of the mortgaging tenant before issuance of the Sheriff's deed on foreclosure will be all that
falls to the surviving tenant.
"Tenants of this kind are said to hold individually and jointly, having one and the same
interest, accruing through one and the same conveyance, commencing at the same time, and held
by one .and the same possession. Upon the death
of one joint tenant, there being no severance of
the estate, his entire interest is cast upon the survivor or survivors, to the exclusion of the inheritance of the same by his heirs. The interest of
the survivor in the realty is consequently increased by the extinguishment of the tenant deceased. It is settled in law that a joint tenant
may alienate or convey to a stranger his p.art or
interest in the realty, and thereby defeat the right
of the survivor. * * * In the ancient language of
the law, joint tenants were said to hold per my et
per tout, or in plain words "by the moiety or half
or by all," the true interpretation of this phrase
being th.at these tenants were seized of the entire
realty for the purpose of tenure and survivorship,
while for the purpose of imrnediate alienation each
had only a particular part or interest. * * * The
interest of each tenant is subject to sale upon
execution. Having these rights and powers at
least over his interest in the land so held there
c.an be no sufficient reason urged why the power
of a joint tenant to rnortgage same should be
denied. Any interest in real estate which a person
n1ay sell and convey he may also mortgage.
(Jones, Mortg. Sec. 13G). vV e are therefore of
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the opinion that a joint tenant may mortgage his
interest in the joint estate in like manner as
though he were a tenant in common and to the extent of the mortgage lien the right of the survivor
wil.l be destroyed or suspended, and the equity of
redemption, at the death of the tenant, will be all
that will fall to the surviving companion. The
right of the tenant to mortgage is supported by
the following authorities: York vs. Stone, 1 Salk.
158; Simpson's Lessee vs. Ammons, 1 Bin. 175.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(Wilkins vs. Young, 144 Indiana 1; 41 N.E.
68.)

A mortgage was executed by two of three
joint tenants. The court held that the mortgage,
although only for security, effected a severance of
the joint tenancy.
(Simpson's Lessee vs. Ammons, 1 Binney
(Perm.) 175, 2 American Dec. 425).

3. ARGUMENT
It is manifest that the mortgage dated !fay 10, 1948
(Ex. 10 P), constitutes a valid and enforceable obligation
against Francis Boydell Goeltz, and the lien thereof
attached to and bound his undiYided one-half interest
in the mortgaged pre1nises. The lien of this mortgage
continued as against the undivided interest of Francis
Boydell Goeltz in the Inortgaged premises after he and
Mrs. Goeltz subsequently quit clain1ed the n1ortgaged
premises to Elise Davis (Ex. 2 P Abstract of title; Ex.
7 P Deed fro1n Goeltz to Davis) .and after Elise Davis
conveyed the mortgaged pren1ises to 1\frs. Goeltz. (Ex.
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2 P Abstract of title; Ex. 8 P, Deed from Davis to Marian
Story Goeltz.)
The promissory note dated May 10, 1948 (Ex. 9 P)
is a joint and several obligation. Defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, admits his own execution of this note and the
1nortgage (Ex. 10 P) securing payment of s.ame. Therefore, Francis Boydell Goeltz is liable on this note for the
amount which is in excess of the then principal amount of
the Pacific Mutual mortgage hereinafter described, which
excess amount on date of this mortgage amounted to the
sum of $3,579.44 (testimony of Henry E. Ogaard R. 76),
together with interest thereon and re.asonable attorney's
fees, cost of suit and incurring costs. His undivided onehalf interest in the mortgaged premises as it existed on
date of execution and delivery of said note and mortgage
became and is now subject to a lien for this total judgment obligation.
POINT II.
RESPONDENT IS SUBROGATED TO RIGHTS OF THE
PACIFIC MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO~MPANY AGAINST
THE ENTIRE O·WNERSHIP AND INTEREST OF THE DEFENDANTS IN THE MORTGAGED PREMISES UNDER THE
MORTGAGE DATED OCTOBER 27, 1936. (Ex. 23 P, Ex. 4 P)
EXECUTED BY THE DEFENDANTS, WHICH MORTGAGE
WAS O:WNED BY SAID INSURANCE COMPANY ON DATE
OF EXECUTION O·F MO·RTGAGE IN RESPONDENT'S
FAVOR (Ex. 10 P) DATED MAY 10, 1948.

1. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 27, 1936, the Appellant and Defendant
Francis Boydell Goeltz then husband and wife, were the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

12
owners of the mortgaged premises in fee simple as joint
tenants and not as tenants in common, (Ex. 2 P. Abstract
of Title; Ex. 3 P, Bronson deed; Admission of Francis
Boydell Goeltz, Answer of Francis Boydell Goeltz;
Testimony of Marian Story Goeltz R. 153.) On that
date they borrowed the sum of $6,000.00 from Respondent
and to evidence their indebtedness executed and delivered their joint and several promissory notes in favor
of Respondent (Ex. 22 P) and. their mortgage securing
payment of said note covering the mortgaged premises
(Ex. 23 P). This note and mortgage were produced in
open court from the possession of Appellant, Marian
Story Goeltz. She in her testimony admitted the genuineness of her signature on both of said documents (R. 147),
and the witness H. D. Henager testified positively that
Mr. and Mrs. Goeltz signed both the note and mortgage
in his presence (R. 101, 102). This note (Ex. 22 P) and
this mortgage (Ex. 23 P) dated October 27, 1936, for
$6,000.00 were thereafter sold and assigned by the Respondent to The R.F.C. l\fortgage Company (Ex. 5 P)
which subsequently sold and assigned them to The Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Company (Ex. 6 P). On May
10, 1948 (date of execution and deliYery of Exs. 9 P and
10 P) the Respondent did not o"rn or hold any interest
either directly or indirectly in said note (Ex. 22 P) and
mortgage (Ex. 23 P). It 'Yas .acting as collection agent
only for The Pacific ~Iutnal Life Insurance Company.
(Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard (R. 73, 76, 88) and H. D.
Henager). There "'n8 due and payable to The Pacific
Mutual Life Insura.nce Con1pany on ~fay 10., 19-!S, on
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said note and mortgage dated October 27, 1936 (Exs. 22 P
and 23 P) the total sum of $3,224.41. (Ex. 14 P, check
in favor of The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company;
testimony of Henry E. Ogaard; testimony of H. D. Henager (R. 106). At the time (a few days prior to May 10,
1948), the defendant Francis Boyd ell Goeltz applied to
the Respondent for a new mortgage loan on the security
of the mortgaged premises, he talked with witness Henry
E. Ogaard. (Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard R. 72).
Ogaard informed Goeltz that the only way the then
existing mortgage (then owned by The Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Company) indebtedness could be increased was by way of a new loan evidenced by a new
note .and mortgage in favor of Respondent, the proceeds
of which would be used in part to pay the balance then
due on the mortgage of October 27, 1936, then owned by
The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company. Goeltz
agreed to this requirement (R. 72, 79, 80). Goeltz at that
time stated he wanted funds with which to pay the cost
of remodeling the house situated on the mortgaged
premises (R. 79), but Ogaard declared to hin1 that the
old loan (Ex. 22 P and 23 P) must be paid (testimony
of l-Ienry E. Ogaard R. 79). When the note and mortgage
evidencing the new loan (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P) had been
drafted, Goeltz first informed Henager that Mrs. Goeltz
was unable to appear at the office of Respondent-to
execute these documents (R. 104). Hen,ager refused to
allow Goeltz to take the note, mortgage and agreement
from the office to secure 1\irs. Goeltz' signature (R. 104).
Goeltz then conferred with J os. E. Benedict, one of
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Respondent'·s officers, and thereupon Benedict directed
Henager to allow Goeltz to take the documents out of the
office for execution by Mrs. Goeltz. (Testimony of H. D.
Henager R. 104, 195) ; testimony of J os. E. Benedict
R. 165, 169). Goeltz thereupon took the documents from
the office and a few days later returned them to Henager
(R. 107). On their face they appeared to be properly
executed and the mortgage duly acknowledged by both
mortgagors R. 105, 116, 117). Thereupon Henager caused
two checks to be drawn (R. 107, 108), one in favor of
The Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company for the
sum of $3,224.41 (Ex. 14 P, R. 106) which Henager delivered to Ogaard (R. 107). A second draft for $3,851.68
was drawn in Goeltz' favor and delivered to him. (Testimony of H. D. Henager R. 107). Ogaard transmitted
the check for $3,224.41 to the payee insurance company.
(Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard, R. 75). The evidence
clearly proves that the proceeds of the mortgage loan
of May 10, 1948, were disbursed in regular and proper
manner (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P, 16 P, 17 P, 18 P) and that
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co1npany was paid and it
received from the proceeds of the ~lay 10, 1948 loan
the sum of $3,224.41 in full satisfaction of the indebtedness due under the n1ortgage of October 27~ 1936 (Exs.
4 P, 22 P, 23 P, R. 75, 76). It "'"aS not until June 12, 1951
that Marian Story Goeltz inforn1ed Benedict, as an
officer of Respondent, that she had not 'vritten.her purported signatures on the note, n1ortgage and agreen1ent
of M.ay 10, 19±8, nor had she authorized any one to sign
her na1ne thereto. (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P; testimony of
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Marian Story Goeltz R. 151); testimony of Jos. E.
Benedict R. 169, 170) ).
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
(a) Where a loan has been obtained by
means of a forged mortgage and the proceeds used to pay off existing encuntbrances against the property, the courts,
without exception, have held that the
mortgagee under the void ntortgage ·is
entitled to be s1tbrogated to the rights of
the prior mort_qagee.

See Annotation 1n 43 A.L.R. at pages
1404, 1405;
See Annotation 1n 151 A.L.R. at page
414;
See Annotation in 70 A.L.R. at pages
1398-1404.
"It is well settled that where the security
given for the loan which is used to pay off .an incumbrance turns out to be void, although the person taking it expected to get good security, he
will be subrogated to the rights of the holder of
the lien which the money advanced is used to pay;
and that in such case the person advancing the
money cannot be regarded as a stranger or volunteer, there being no intervening equity to prevent" ( 25 Ruling Case Law, 1343).
Newcomber, et al vs. Sibon, 119 Kan. 358; 239 P.
1110; 43 A.L.R. 1387. (Husband forged wife's
signature to mortgage.)
Serial Building Loan and Savings Inst. vs. Eberhardt, 95 N.J. Eq. 607, 124 Atl. 56. (I-Iusband
forged wife's signature to rnortgage.)
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Davis vs. Pugh, 81 Ark. 253; 99 S.W. 78. (Husband forged wife's signature to mortgage.)
Zinkeisen vs. Lewis, 63 Kan. 590; 66 P. 644. (Husband forged wife's signature to mortgage.)
"The authorities ar~ in conflict upon the right
of one lending money· upon the security of a
forged or unauthorized mortgage to be subrogated
to the lien of the prior mortgage which has been
discharged by the money advanced on the void
mortgage. However, a majority in number, and
in our opinion the better reasoned cases, hold that
one lending money upon the security of a void
mortgage is entitled to be subrogated to the rights
of the mortgagee under the prior valid mortgage
which has been discharged with proceeds of the
void one." (Landis vs. State, 179 Okla. 547; 66
P. 2d 519 ; 151 .A..L.R. 403.) Hon1e Owners' Loan
Corp. vs. Papara, 241 Wis. 112; 3 N.W. (2nd) 730,
·140 A.L.R. 1289.
"Subrogation will be allowed to the lender
of money on the security of a forged deed of trust
or mortgage, or one which is invalid because of
the failure of the 'vife to join. JJ!ere negligence of
the one seeking subrogation in failing to procure a
properly executed mortgage will not, at least in
the abse·n.ce of interl~ening equities, defeat his
right of subrogation." (En1phasis supplied.)
(50 Am. J ur., Subrogation, Sec. 99, pg. 744).
Katschor vs. Ley, 153 Kan. 569; 113 P. 2d 128.
(b) "The ge11erally accepted ·v£ew at the pres-

ent thne) holcever, is that it is 1wt necessary that there should be an express
agreernent that the prior lien shall be
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signed, but if from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction
it is clearly to be i~mplied that it was the
intention of the parties that the person
making the advance was to have security
of equal dignity and position with that
discharged, then equity will so decree. In
such cases, equity speaking from the
standpoint of good conscience, substitutes the person so paying the debt to the
place of the original creditor, so far as
to enable him to enforce the security
for the purpose of reimbursement." ( 25
Ruling Case Law, Sec. 24, cited with
approval in Martin vs. 1-Iickenlooper,
infra.)
"Therefore, whatever may have been the old
test of what constituted a volunteer, stranger and
intermeddler, we believe that the decided trend
of modern authorities is to take a liberal view of
the question; and being guided by this modern
view we are of the opinion that a volunteer, a
stranger, and intermeddler, is one who thrusts
himself into a situation of his own initiative, and
not one who becomes a party to a transaction upon
the urgent petition of a person who is vitally
interested, and whose rights would be sacrificed
did he not respond to the importunate appeal. If
this conception is in keeping with what we believe
to be the modern and better view, it is clear that
appellant was no stranger, volunteer or interIneddler,. If he was not, why should he suffer~"
In this case James executed a mortgage to
Schmitt, and then conveyed the mortgaged preInises to his daughters subject to the mortgage.
James died. One of the daughters was a rninor.
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Her guardian joined in a mortgage to plaintiff
to obtain funds with which to pay the Schmitt
mortgage. The guardian's mortgage was void
because of lack of statutory authority in the court
which authorized the mortgage in the guardianship proceeding. The plaintiff was by this decision subrogated to the rights of Schmitt. (Laffranchini vs. Clark, 39 Nev. 48; 153 P. 250.)
An owner of mortgaged real property died
intestate leaving a widow and adult children. The
children conveyed their interest in the real estate
to their mother. A mortgage on the real property
was past due. It was necessary to renew it or
secure a new loan to prevent foreclosure. The
widow mortgaged the real estate to plaintiff for
funds used to pay the mortgage against land at
time of her husband's death. Held, as against administrator and general creditors of deceased,
plaintiff was entitled to be subrogated to the
rights of the holder of original mortgage. (Federal Land Bank of Wichita vs. Hanks, 123 Kan.
329, 254 P. 1040.)
"In this case Sutherland loaned his money to
the O"'"ner of the leasehold estate for the purpose
of paying off the lien held by_ the investment company, belieYing and expecting that he would get
the sa1ne security that the con1pany had whose
liens he paid, but .afterwards learned of the $1,000.00 mortgage held by the plaintiff. An application of the equitable doctrine of subrogtion to
the transaetion giYes to the cross-co1nplainant
(Sutht)rland) the security he " . .as led tQ believe
he \vas getting, and the srune that was held by
the creditor 'vhose debt he p.aid, and the plaintiff
is left the san1e security he had before. Sutherland is substituted for the investn1ent con1pany as
creditor and lien holder. * * * Tested alone by
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the earlier cases, Sutherland might be regarded
as a volunteer, but latterly the doctrine of subrogation has been developed and expanded and given
a wider application to business matters. By analogy it has been applied to transactions similar to
the one under consideration - to one having no
previous interest to protect, who pays off .a mortgage, or advances money for its payment, at
the instance of the mortgagor and for his benefit,
when no innocent party can be injured, believing
he is getting security equal to that of the person
whose debt he pays. We cannot hold Sutherland
a mere volunteer and stranger, officiously intermeddling by paying debts due the Pacific Investment Company." (George vs. Butler, 16 Utah
111, 50 p. 1032.)
Walker Bros. Bankers was administrator of
the estate of one Merriam. Bingham was adininistrator of the estate of one Cr.ane·. Crane in his
lifetime became indebted to one McMillan. After
McMillan died his heirs pressed the heirs of Crane
and Crane's widow for payment. Crane had borrowed funds from one Norman and deposited
shares of mining stock as security for papnent.
Merriam had signed the note in favor of Norman
(along with Crane) as an accomodation maker.
Norman did not demand pay1nent of his note at
that time. Before Merria1n's death he attempted
to negotiate on behalf of l\!rs. Crane a settlement
of the McMillan debt. Merriam died before completion of negotiations. The bank, after its a ppointment as Merriam's administrator and before
the appointment of an administrator for Crane's
estate, renewed these negotiations. It finally
secured an agreement from lVlrs. Crane alone (no
administrator having been appointed on her husband's estate) whereby the shares of mining stock
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20
held by Norman should be sold and from the proceeds the Norman note was to be paid and also
the indebtedness due the McMillan heirs. This
agreement was carried out. The action was
brought by the administrator of Crane's estate,
when he was appointed, against the bank as Merriam's administrator, to recover certain shares of
mining stock held by Merriam at the time of
death and the dividends therefrom (and which
were held by the bank as Merriam's administrator) to be declared the property of the Crane
estate. The evidence showed that these shares
of stock belonged to Crane free from claim of
Merriam or his administrator, and part of them,
at least, had been transferred to Merriam by
Crane in fraud of Crane's creditors. The Bank,
as Merriam's administrator, having paid the debt
owing from Crane to the McMillan heirs asserted
the right to be subrogated to the rights of the
McMillan heirs against the Crane estate. In denying the right of subrogation the court held that
(1) There was no legal subrogation because
neither Merriam nor the bank as his administrator were under compulsion to pay the indebtedness due the McMillan heirs.- Merriam's obligation on the joint note of himself and Crane to
Norman did not furnish this compulsion.
"Whe-re the person who p.ays the debt of another stands in the situation of surety or is compelled to pay to protect his own right or property,
the right of subrogation is a consequence which
equity attaches to such a condition, and the right
of subrogation under such circumstances is not a
direct result of an agreement. This, in law, is
termed 'legal subrogation.' "
(2) There was no conventional subrogation
because the agreement with the 'vidow of Crane
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did not bind the estate, and as a consequence the
bank, as administrator, in making payment to the
McMillan heirs, did not do so under a valid binding con tract.
"Conventional subrogation depends upon a
lawful contract * * *. It requires no argument to
show that Mrs. Crane's approval and acceptance
of the defendant's proposal, in so far as it attempted to bind the estate of Elias W. Crane, deceased, is void. (Dunn vs. Wallingford, 47 U ta.h
491, 155 P. 347.) The agreement does not purport
to assign or in any way bind Mrs. Crane's distributive share of the estate. Whatever may be
its affect in that connection is not before us, and
we do not attempt to say." (Bingham vs. Walker
Bros. Bankers, Administrator, 75 Utah 149, 283
P. 1055.)
Stoven and wife executed a mortgage in
favor of Utah State Land Board, and then conveyed the mortgaged premises to Hickenlooper.
Hickenlooper executed a second mortgage to Martin. Thereafter Hickenlooper conveyed the premises, subject to the two mortgages, to Fritsch
Loan and Trust Co. Some time later Fritsch Loan
and Trust Co. executed a mortgage to Zorn and
the proceeds were used to pay the mortgage to
the State. Martin's mortgage was of record and
unreleased. Martin thereafter foreclosed his
mortgage against Hickenlooper, making Zorn a
party. Zorn contended that she was subrogated
to the rights of the State under its mortgage from
Stoven. The trial court found that Fritsch
(through its mortgages) agreed that the Zorn
mortgage should be a first lien and represented it
was such. The Supreme Court (Wolfe, J.) held:
(1) That there was no legal subrogation;
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(2) That there was a "conventional" subrogation, writing as follows:
"Without determining that a 'conventional'
subrogation will be found in case it appears that
the lender 'intended' or 'supposed' he was to be
equally well secured, as he would have been had
he taken an assignment of the lien his advancements paid off and released (which, if so. decided
might work a situation where one would be better
off by failing to examine a record than had he
taken that precaution) suffice it to say that where
there is a promise on the part of the mortgagor
or his transferee, given to one who pays off a lien,
that such lender would .be equally in as good
position as regards security as the lienholder
whose lien his money was intended to discharge
and did discharge, he will be considered in equity
as an assignee of the lien and especially where
assurances are given him that his lien will be
and is a first lien. The evidence in this case, we
think is amply sufficient to establish such a promise." (J\1:artin vs. Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 185, 59
P. 2d 1139, 61 P. 2d 307; 107 A.L.R. 762.)
3. ARGUMENT

There can be no doubt as to the right of the Respondent to be subrogated to the rights of The Pacific
.. Mutual Life Insurance Co1npany as against the entirt
interest of the Appellant and Francis Boydell Goeltz
and each of the1n in and to the mortgaged premises to
the extent that the proceeds of the 1\Iay 10, 1948 loan
were used to pay the mortgage indebtedness due on that
date from the defendants to The Pacific ~Iutual Life Insurance Company. This an1ounted to the sun1 of $3,224.41
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with interest for May 10, 1948 at 4¥2% per annum. The
obligation owing from Appellant and Francis Boydell
Goeltz to the Insurance Company was a joint and several
obligation (Ex. 22 P, Ex. 23 P) and admitted by both of
them to be a valid claim. Therefore, e.ach of them was
liable for the whole amount of the indebtedness. This
indebtedness was secured by a mortgage lien (Ex. 23 P)
upon the entire premises and the total interests of the
Appellant and Francis Boydell Goeltz in the premises
were subject to said security lien, the validity of which
1\!rs. Goeltz frankly admits.
The authorities cited above clearly demonstrate the
increasing favor of the modern rule that it is not necessary that there should be an express agreement that the
prior mortgage lien should be kept alive for the benefit
of one advancing money to pay it or that it should be
assigned. The court will consider all of the facts and
circumstances of the transaction, and, if from same it is
to be implied that it was the intention of the parties
that the person making the adv.ance was to have security
of equal dignity and position with that discharged, then
the person making the advance is subrogated to all of
the rights and benefits of the prior mortgage. In this
case Ogaard informed Goeltz that the only w.ay in which
a new loan could be negotiated would be by way of using
part of the proceeds of the new loan to pay the Pacific
Mutual mortgage. Goeltz agreed thereto. Here is a
situation that even brings the c.ase squarely within the
old rule, because this part of the transaction clearly
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manded, a first mortgage lien. The Respondent did not
merely "suppose" or "intend" that it secure a first
lien mortgage; it actually required such first mortgage
lien as security for making a new loan and Goeltz agreed
thereto. The facts are stronger for subrogation than
those in Martin vs. Hickenlooper, supra: (a) in this case
no rights of a third party are involved, e.g. Martin, the
second mortgagee in the Hickenlooper case (the Respondent is asserting the right of subrogation as to an acknowledged debt under Pacific Mutual's mortgage) and (b) Respondent knew ·of the existence of the Pacific Mutual
mortgage and demanded that it be paid from the proceeds of the new loan as a condition precedent to making
the new loan, "the old loan would have to be paid off"
(Ogaard's testimony). Whether there is applied to these
facts the so-called "old" or conservative rule or the "modern" more equitable rule, the results are the same. Respondent definitely is subrogated to the rights of Pacific
Mutual against the two Goeltzes personally and also
against the mortgaged premises as an entirety to the
extent of $3,224.41, plus interest at 4¥2% per annum from
May 10, 1948.
POINT III.
A SIGNATURE TO AN INSTRUMENT MADE WITHOUT
AUTHORITY O·F THE PERSON WHOSE SIGNATURE IT
PURPORTS TO BE IS A DEFENSE AVAILABLE TO HIM
UNDER SEC. 44-12-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, UN..
LESS HE IS ESTOPPED, BUT THE UNAUTHORIZED SIGNATURE IS NO DEFENSE TO HIS C0-1\IAKER WHOSE
SIGNATURE IS GENUINE AND VALID.
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1. STATEMENT OF FAC'TS
The signatures of defendant, Marian Story Goeltz,
on the promissory note, mortgage and agreement dated
May 10, 1948 (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P) were made without
her authority. (Testimony of Marian Story Goeltz (R.
147, 145; testimony of J. Percy Goddard R. 129). The
Respondent at time of delivery of said instruments to it
had no knowledge that the defendant, Marian Story
Goeltz, did not in fact sign these instruments, but was
the honest belief that they were her genuine signatures. (Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard R. 63; testimony of H. D. Henager R. 105; testimony of Jos. E.
Benedict R. 171, 172, 173.) The defendant, Francis
Boydell Goeltz, admits the genuineness of his signatures
on these instruments which purport to be his signatures,
and that the instruments as to himself are genuine.
(Answer of defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz.)

2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
"\\There a signature is forged, or made without the authority of the person whose signature jt
purports to be, it is wholly inoperative, and no
right to retain the instru1nent or give a discharge
therefor, or to enforce payment thereof against
any party thereto can be acqu,ired thro-ugh or
under such signature, unless the party a.r;ainst
whom it is sought to enforce such right is precluded from setting up the forgery or want of
authority."
(Sec. 44-1-24, Utah Code Ann.
Act, Sec. 23.)

~953;

Unifor1n
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"Forgery defined: Every person who, with
intent to defraud another, falsely makes, alters,
forges ot counterfeits any * * * indenture, * * *
promissory note * * * or utters, publishes or
·passes, or attempts to pass, as true and genuine
any of the above ·named false, altered, forged or
count.erfeited matters * * * kno-wing the same
to be false, altered, forged or counterfeited * * ·'~~=
with intent to prejudice, damage or defraud· anyperson * * * is guilty of forgery."
·
(Sec. ·76-26-1, Utah· Code Ann. 1953.)
(a) It is not .forgery to write another's name

, with authority·. To establish forgery the
proof must show not only the person
whose name is signed to the. instrument
did not sign it, but also that his name
was signed without authority. (State of
Utah vs. Jones, 81 Utah· 503; 20 P. 2d
615.)
(b) An unauthorized signature to a bill or

note is a defense available to the party
whose name has been written without his
authority, but is no defense to a comaker whose signature is genuine. (10
Corpus Juris Sec., Sec. 493, pg. 1086.)
"The fact that so1ne of the signatures to a
note are forged does not necessarily render the
note void against those whose signatures are
genuine." (Joyce Defenses to Con1mercial Paper
(2nd Ed.) \Tol. 1,. Sec. 192, pg. 192.)
"In an action by a payee against one who
has signed a note as surety, it is no defense
thereto that the name of one or more of the
obligors on· such instrun1ent has been forged,
though the surety signed the sa1ne. in the belief
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that the signatures were genuine, where it appears
that the instrument was accepted by the payee
without notice of the forgery." (Morris Plan Co.
vs. Alder, et al., 126 Misc. (NY) 237, 213 N.Y.
Supp. 227.)
Plaintiff sued on notes signed by Davis and
also purportedly signed by his wife. Davis admitted he signed his wife's name to the note
without .authority. He defended the action on the
basis of an Oklahoma statute identical with Sec.
23 of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act.
Held: "Said statute is not applicable in behalf
of Davis who did sign the notes." (Davis vs.
Rotenberg, 124 Okla. 74; 254 P. 37.)
Defendant was sued on a note which had been
.altered and as a defense relied on a statute
equivalent to Sec. 23 of the Uniform Negotiable
Instrument Act, claiming it released him frorn
liability. The Court said: "* * * the section provides that no rights can be predicated upon such
forged or unauthorized signatures, except against
a party "who has been precluded from asserting
the forgery or want of authority, but goes no
further than to make said signature inoperative
and to bar enforcement of rights founded thereon.
The language is carefully chosen to confine the
effect of the section to the specific points covered
thereby. It does not purport to declare the instrument void nor the genuine signatures thereon inoperative. It protects the party whose signatur~
has been forged or affixed vvithout his authority;
but contains no provisions releasing other parties
from whatever liability they have assumed."
(Public Bank of New York vs. l(nox-Burchard
Mer. Co., 135 l\iinn. 171, 160 N. W. 667, 668.)
"But it does not follow that proof of one
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28

forged signature on a note must of necessity and
in all cases be given affect to avoid the note in
favor of those whose signatures thereto are found
to be genuine. Such result is not dictated by
Code Supp. 1902, Sec. 3060.3 (Sec. 23 N.I. Act).
* * * It is the forged and unauthorized signature
that is declared to be inoperative." (Beem vs.
Farrell, 135 Iowa 670; 113 N.W. 509.)
See also to the same effect as above:
Bentel's Brannon Negotiable Instrument Law
(7th Ed.), Sec. 23, pg. 437;
First National Bank of Durant vs. Shaw, 157
Mich. 192, 121 N.W. 809;
Van Slyke vs. Rooks, 181 Mich. 88; 147 N.W.
579;
Fretwell vs. Carter, 78 S.C. 531; 59 S.E. 639;
Newark Finance Co. vs. Aocella, 115 N.J. L.
449, 180 Atl. 863.
In connection with the application of Sec. 44-1-24,
Utah Code Ann. 1953 (Sec. 23 of Uniform Act) above
quoted to the 1948 note and n1ortgage (Ex. 9 P and 10 P)
it must never be forgotten that in Utah
"the n1ortgage follows the debt as a mere incident
and shares the in1111unity of the note fron1 defenses and equities, so that in proceedings to
enforce the 1nortgage nothing can be alleged
against it 'vhich could not have been set up as
a defense to an action at lR\V upon the note." (27
Cyc. 1324.)
The above rule was quoted 'vith approval in Smith
vs. Jarman, 61 Utah 125, 211 Pac. 962, where the Court
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made the classic statement: "the debt is the principal
thing." The Court in First National Bank of Salt Lake
vs. Haymond, 89 Utah 151, 57 Pac. (2nd) 1401, approved
Smith vs. Jarman stating:
"A mortgage is an incident to the obligation
which it is given to secure. Even though the mortgaged property be destroyed the mortg.agors and
other obligors remain liable for the payment of
the debt."
3. ARGUMENT
Francis Boydell Goeltz .admitted in his answer that
the signatures on the note, mortgage and agreement
dated May 10, 1948 (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P), which purport
to be his signatures are in fact his signatures, and that
as to himself he executed and delivered these instruments
to Respondent.
A casual inspection of the 1948 note (Ex. 9 P) shows
that it is .a negotiable promissory note (Sec. 44-1-1 to and
including Sec. 44-1-6, Utah Code Ann. 1953 (Negotiable
Instruments Act). Therefore, the provisions of Sec. 441-1, Utah Code Ann. 1953, as construed by the Courts,
sustains the validity of the 1948 note and mortgage
against Francis Boydell Goeltz.
POINT IV.
APPELLANT, MARIAN STORY GOELTZ, AS TO RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED TO DENY THAT THE TITLE TO
THE MORTGAGED PREMISES WAS OTHER THAN SHOWN
ON THE PUBLI·C DEED RECORDS, TO-WIT THAT THE
PREMISES WERE HELD IN JOINT TENANCY BY HERSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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SELF AND HER THEN HUSBAND, FRANCIS BOYDELL
GOELTZ, DURING THE ENTIRE PERIOD RESPONDENT
DEALT WITH THEM.

1. STATEMENT OF FACTS
The mortgaged premises were acquired on July 30,
1936, by the Appellant and her then husband, Francis
Boydell Goeltz, by w.arranty deed executed by the Bronsons, which conveyed the same to Appellant and Francis
Boydell Goeltz as joint tenants. The title thus acquired
stood on the public deed records unchanged from date
of acquisition to March 31, 1952, when the premises were
awarded Respondent by decree of the Third District
Court entered in the first divorce action - a period of
fifteen years and eight months. When both the 1936
and 1948 mortgages were negotiated, the public deed
records showed that Respondent and her then husband,
Francis Boydell Goeltz, owned the premises in joint
tenancy.
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
"A 1nortgagor is estopped, as against the
mortgagee fro1n denying that l1e had at the tune
of the execution of the n1ortgage, seisin or such
title as the 1nortgage purports to convey." (36
Am. Jur. l\[ortgages, Sec. :2-±0, pg. 811.)
"An estopped 'vill .arise against an owner of
real property, "\Yhere he clothes the person assuming to dispose of the property "\vith apparent title
to it or with apparent authority to dispose of it
and when the person setting up the estoppel acts
and parts 'vith value or extends credit on the
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fai~th

of such apparent ownership and authority."
(19 Am. Jur. - Estoppel - Sees. 67 and 68, pg.
687; Annotation L.R.A. 1918 B, pg. 735.)
(a) Where one of two innocent parties muat
suffer by fraud perpetrated by another,
the law imposes the loss upon the party
who by his misplaced confidence has enabled the fra?-td to be committed.

(19 Am. Jur.- Estoppel- Sec. 67, pg.
695; Seger vs. ,V. T. Ravvleigh Co.,
153 Va. 514; 50 SE 244; 66 ALR
305.)
(b) For a wife to permit the record title of
her real property to remain in her husband is in itself a representation that he
is the owner thereof, and if she acquieces
in his holding of the title for a considerable period of time, she is witho1tt
further act on her part, estop·ped to deny
his title as against persons who have relied on the appearance which she thus
allowed to be created.

Kinsley vs. Bank, 131 Kansas 448,
292 Pac. 798;
Annotation 76 ALR at pg. 1507;
Duckwell vs. Kisner, 136 Ind. 99; 35
NE 697;
McCormick Harvester, etc. Co. vs.
Perkins, 135 Iowa 64, 110 NW
15;
Pierce vs. Hower, 142 Ind. 642; 42
NE 223.
(c) The existence of the joint tenancy on the
face of the public record between the
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Goeltz, prohibited Appellant from introducing evidence to show either her (a)
entire ownership of the property or (b)
that her interest therein was greateT
than the title deed from the Bronsons
showed on its face because
(1) Joint tenants hold their prop-

erty by one title and one right,
which consists of four unities:
(1) interest (2) title (3) time
(4) possession. (14 Am. Jur.
-cotenancy, Sec. 7 and 8, pg.
81; Wilkins vs. Young, 144 Ind.
1; 41 NE 68; Swartzbaugh vs.
Sampson, 11 Cal. App. (2d)
451, 54 Pac. (2d) 73.)
(2) Even where one contributes the
entire purchase price for land
but places it in joint tenancy
with another, the rights of
each in and to the land are the
same and the one who makes
the contribution has by that act
1nade an immediate gift to the
other. C~Iader Ys. Stemler, 319
Pa. 374; 179 Atl. 719; Re Cochran 3±2 Pa. 108; 20 Atl. (2d)
305 ; 135 ALR 1058.)
(2) As to one another and as to

third parties, joint tenants are
seized of equal undivided interests in the property. ( 2 Alnerican Law of Property (1952),
Sec. 6.10.)

SPECIAL NOTE:
The case of Ga'l"rett vs.
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Ellison, 93 Utah 184, 72 Pac.
(2nd) 449, is clearly distinguishable bec.ause (a) a tenancy
in common was involved; and
(b) it was litigation between
two tenants in common and did
not involve third persons.
Hence, the rule that the parol
evidence rule does not prevent
parties on one side of a written
contract from showing by parol
evidence what the agreement is
between themselves. (For an
annotation on the admissibility
of p.arol evidence to overcome
the presumption that tenants in
common have equal interests
where the title instrument does
not disclose the proportionate
interests in actions between the
tenants or their priVIes, see.
156 ALR 515.
3. ARGUMENT

The appellant for fifteen years and eight months
permitted the title to the mortgaged premises to stand
on the public deed records of Salt Lake County in the
names of herself and Francis Boydell Goeltz in joint
tenancy ;and thereby she held out to the world and to the
Respondent in particular that Mr. Goeltz owned an undivided one-half interest in the same. In the year 1936
she and Mr. Goeltz, her then husband, borrowed from
Respondent the sum of $6,000.00 upon the security of a
mortgage on the premises, which mortgage she admits
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she executed and which she admits was valid. The status
of the title on May 10, 1948 (the date of the mortgage,
Etx. 10 P) was exactly the same as it was on October 27,
1936 (the date of the mortgage owned by Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co., Ex. 4 P). Respondent relied upon
this public record as to the status of the title to the
property when it made the 1948 loan. It was clearly
entitled to do so because of Appellant's acts in regard to
the same. Not only did she join her then husband in
executing the 1936 mortgage \vhen the title stood in their
names as joint tenants, but for a decade and a half thereafter she permitted the public record title to remain in
the same status. No clearer case of estoppel in pais can
be established - an estoppel 'vhich denies Appellant's
right to prove by extraneous evidence that the ownership
of the premises was other than it was on the public
records and upon \vhich Respondent manifestly relied in
making the 1948 loan. This estoppel operates against
Appellant's .adverse clain1 - not at any tin1e asserted
by her prior to this la\Y suit - that Francis Boydell
Goeltz did not own an undivided one-half interest in the
mortgaged pren1ises. The trial court properly excluded
evidence in support of such clain1 as the Respondent \Yas
entitled to rely upon the representations n1ade by . .A. ppellant through the operation of the public deed records.
The authorities cited above support Respondent's position beyond per-adventure.
It is clear beyond .argun1ent that as to defendant,
Francis Boydell Goeltz, the note, 1nortgage and agreement of May 10, 19-±8, (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P) are binding
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upon him and enforceable against him personally and
also that the lien of the mortgage (Ex. 10 P) attached to
and bec.ame an encumbrance upon his undivided one-half
interest in the mortgaged premises held and owned by
him at the time he executed and delivered these instruments to the plaintiff.

POINT V.
FORM AND REQUIREMENTS OF JUDGMENT.

1. STATEMENT AS TO FORM OF JUDGMENT
Respondent submits that the rules of law above set
forth as applied to the ultimate facts which are established by the evidence in this case entitle it to the judgment entered by the trial court awarding it relief as
follows:
1. There should be a joint and several judgment
against the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, and Appellant, Marian Story Goeltz, for the sum of $3,224.41,
plus interest at 4¥2% per annum from February 1, 1953,
both before and after judgment.

Comment: The note ;and mortgage dated October 27,
1936 (Exs. 22 P and 23 P) were joint and several obligations; hence a joint and several judgments against defendant~ is proper. Interest on the total principal mortgage obligation ($6,803.05) was paid to February 1, 1953.
(Testimony of Henry E. Ogaard, R. 64, Ex. 12 P, Ex.
13 P). The princip.al amount of $3,224.41 is the exact
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pany in satisfaction of its obligation and Respondent is
subrogated to the rights of the insurance company under
its mortgage for this amount plus interest at the rate
of 41/2 % per annum from February 1, 1953, both before
and after judgment. A personal joint and several judgment against the defendant mortgagors was proper and
is legally sustained.
2. There should be a separate judgment against defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, alone for the sum of
$3,579.44, plus interest at 4¥2% per annum from February 1, 1953, both before and after judgment, plus interest
at 3;i% per month on delinquent instalhnent of interest,
together with attorney's fees in the sum of $750.00 and
Respondent's costs and disbursements, including cost of
abstract of title extension and costs on sheriff's sale.
Comment: The defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, is
alone liable on the note, mortgage and agreement of May
10, 1948 (Ex. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P). The principal an1ount of
judgment against hin1 represents the difference between
the total principal a1nount due plaintiff, viz. $6,803.85
(testimony of Henry E. Ogaard, R. 64) and the amount
of $3,224.41 p.aid The Pacific ~Iutual Life Insurance
Cornpany and for 'vhirh the defendants are jointly and
severally liable a~ above set forth in 1 supra ($6,803.85
minus $3,:22-t.-t-1, equals $3,579.4-1:). Interest on this
an1ount of $3,579.-t-l- also eonnnences on February 1~ 1953~
the date to 'vhieh interest 'vas paid to Respondent. The
judgutent against Fr.aneis Boydell Goeltz '"ill also include
costs of abstract of title extension, $750.00 attorney's fees
and costs incurred and to be incurred by Respondent.
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These items are authorized by the note and mortgage
dated May 10, 1948, supra.
3. The judgment should provide that the mortgage
of October 27, 1936, and the mortgage of March 10, 1948,
be e,ach foreclosed and that the mortgaged premises be
sold by and under the direction of the Sheriff of Salt
Lake County, Utah, according to the following described
formula and process:
(a) All of the right, title, claim and interest of the
Appellant, Marian Story Goeltz, in and to the mortgaged
permises and all of the right, title, claim and interest of
the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, (other than the
undivided one-half interest of said defendant, Francis
Boydell Goeltz, in and to the mortgaged premises which
will be sold under and by virtue of the order of sale
issued pursuant to (b) infra) in and to the mortgaged
premises, should be sold to satisfy the joint and several
judgment against Appellant, Marian Story Goeltz, and
the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, in the principal
amount of $3,224.41, plus interest as above set forth. A
separate order of sale should be issued by the Clerk
on this judgment, directing the sale of the respective
interests of the said defendants in the mortgaged premises. The Sheriff should be directed to give separate
notice of this s,ale and hold the sale separately. This sale
must be noticed and held prior to the sale directed
in (b) infra. Any party to this action may bid at the
sale. The Respondent may use its joint and several judgment against said defendants as cash, after paying the
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Sheriff's costs of sale in cash.
(b) The undivided one-half interest in the mortgaged premises of defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz,
should be sold subsequently to the sale directed in (a)
supra to satisfy the separate and individual judgment
against him in the principal amount of $3,579.44 plus
interest, cost of abstract of title, attorney's fees and
costs as above set forth. A separate order of sale should
be issued by the Clerk on this judgment dire·cting the
sale of said undivided one-half interest of said defendant.
The Sheriff should be directed to give separate notice of
this sale and hold the sale separately. Any party to
this action may bid at the sale. The plaintiff may use
its said judgment as cash, after paying the Sheriff
costs of sale in cash. This s.ale should be held second
in time.
Comment: The mortgage of October 27, 1936 (the Pacific

Mutual mortgage) bound all of the interest of appellant,
Marian Story Goeltz, in the premises and all of the interest of defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, in the pre1nises.
The execution of the n1ortgage of !fay 10, 1948, by
the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, had the legal
effect, as above den1onstrated, of binding his undivided
one-half interest in the n1ortgaged premises as hereinafter indentified. As a consequenee the individual
judgment against hiu1 should be satisfied out of the
sale of this undivided one-half interest as hereinafter
identified.
Equitable consider,ations dictate separate sales which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39
will give rise to separate rights of redemption. It must
be kept in mind that on the respective dates of the
mortgage of October 27, 1936, and the mortgage of May
10, 1948, that the defendants were owners in joint
tenancy of the mortgaged premises and that the rights of
Respondent under these mortgages are determined as of
s.aid dates. Subsequent conveyance of the premises will
not affect these rights as the sheriff's sale of the premises carries the respective ownership of the defendants
as of said dates.
2. CITATION OF AUTHORITIES
(a) References to Utah Stattttes and Rules
of Civil Procedure.
"Sales of real property under judgments of
forclosure of mortgages are subject to redemption
as in case of s.ales under execution generally* * *"
(Sec. 78-37-6, Utah Code Ann. 1953).
"Property sold subject to redemption, or any
part sold separately may be redeemed by the
following persons or their successors in interest
(1) The judgment debtor; (2) a creditor having a
lien by judgment or mortgage on the property
sold, or some share or part thereof, subsequent to
that on which the property was sold." (Rule 69
f (1) Utah R.C.P.)

"* * * If the debtor redeems the effect of the
sale is termin.ated and he is restored to his
estate. * * *." (Rule 69 f (5) Utah R.C.P.
"Upon a sale of real property the officer shall
give the purchaser a certificate of sale * * *. The
real property sold shall be subject to redemption,
except where the estate sold is less than a leaseSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hold of a two-years unexpired term, in which event
said sale is absolute." (Rule 69 f (1) Utah Rules
C.P.)
(b) Legal title does not pass under mortgage

foreclosure sale, and new owner is not
substituted until the sale is consummated
by a Sheriff's conveyance. The judgment debtor is, in contemplation of law,
the owner of the p·roperty sold under
execution during the redemption period
and has right to its use and occupancy.
The purchaser's interest is an equitable
interest during period of redemption,
subject to be lost, cancelled or taken
away by the debtor, any redemptioner or
their assigns. (Local Realty Co. vs.
Lundquist, 96 Utah 297, 25 Pac. (2d)
770, at pg. 772.)
The above doctrine was cited with
approval in Layton vs. Layton, 105 Utah
1; 140 Pac. (2d) 759, 762.
(c) When the judgment debtor redeems fro,m
the effect of the sale is terminated and
he is restored to his former estate.
Therefo're a s~tbordinate lien is not divested or destroyed by reason of the redemption by the judgment debtor or
assigns of the property front a sale
under a prior lien. It is revived and
becomes effective and may be enforced.

De Roberts vs. Stiles, 24 Wash. 211;
64 Pac. 795;
Stryker vs. Dunn, 72 Colo. 45; 209
Pac. 644, 645;
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Ford vs. N akomis State Bank, 135
Wash. 37 ; 237 Pac. 314;
Flanders vs. Aumack, 32 Ore. 19; 51
Pac. 447;
Porter vs. Steel Comp.any, 122 U.S.
267; 7 Sup. Ct. 1206;
Horton vs. l\1offat, 14 Minn. 289;
100 Am. Dec. 222 ;
Freeman on Executions (2nd) Sec.
182;
Curtis vs. Millard, 14 Iowa 128; 81
Am. Dec. 460 ;
Milhoover vs. Walker, 636 Colo. 22;
164 Pac. 504;
Warren vs. Fish, 7 Minn. 432 ;
Kilpatrick Bros. Co. vs. Campbell,
48 Idaho 194; 281 Pac. 471;
42 Corpus Juris, pg. 451-453;
18 Cal. J ur. pg. 599, Sec. 815;
19 R.C.L. 655;
Bateman vs. Kellog, 59 Cal. App.
464; 211 Pac. 46, 51, 52;
Kopp vs. Thele, 104 Minn. 267; 116
NW 472; 17 L.R.A. (NS) 981;
Am. Jur., Mortgages, Vol. 37, Sec.
854. pg. 229.
The difference in .applicable rule in
Utah where certificate of sale does not
pass title and the mortgagor is entitled
to possession during period of redemption, and the Montana rule where the
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certificate passes title and gives the
purchaser the right to charge mortgagor
for use .and occupancy during the period
of redemption is illustrated in
Hamilton v. Hamilton, 51 Mont 509;
154 Pac. 72·3; Dipple v. Nevill, 82
Mont. 280; 267 Pac. 214.
(d) Under Rule 69 f (5) Utah R.C.P. the
term "judgment debtor" includes "successor in interest," and the effect of a
reden~ption by a "successor in interest"
is to terminate the sale and the "Judgrnent debtor" or his "successor in interest" are restored to the former estate of
the "judgment debtor."
(Bateman v. Kellog, 59 Cal. App. 464;
211 Pac. 46, 51, 52)

SPECIAL NOTE :
The I{ansas cases holding that a
reden1ption fron1 a foreclosure sale on a
first or prior n1ortgage by the judgn1ent
debtor or successor in interest bars foreclosure on a junior n1ortgage thereafter
are based upon a statute which forbids
such foreclosure and declares that the
only ren1edy of a junior n1ortgagee is
by exercise of right of reden1ption.
Hence the rule is not applicable in l~tah.
(McFall v. Ford, 133 Kan. 593 ~ 1 Pac.
(2nd) 273)
Further the /( ansas and Montana
statutes expressly forbid the sale of the
right of rede1nption on execution sale.
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(Sigler vs. Phares, 105 Kan. 115;
181 P.ac. 628; 5 ALR 145; Hamilton v.
Hamilton, supra)
The Utah statutes and Rules of
Civil Procedure do not forbid the sale
of the right of redemption by execution.
3. ARGUMENT
Four important facts must be borne in mind: (a)
the Appellant and defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz,
owned of record as joint tenants the mortgaged premises
on dates of both the 1936 and 1948 mortgages; (b) there
are no intervening liens or mortgages between the date
of the 1936 mortgage and the 1948 mortgage; (c) the
Appellant did not acquire sole ownership of the mortgaged premises until the decree of the Third District
Court in the first divorce action dated March 31, 1952practically four years subsequent to the execution of
the 1948 mortgage; and (d) the rights of all parties will,
of course, be determined by the status of the property
at the time the 1936 and 1948 mortgages were given.
The acquisition by Appellant of sole ownership of the
property long subsequent to the dates of these mortgages does not affect the rights of Respondent under
these mortgages. The subsequent sole ownership by
Appellant of the property affects the right of redemption only.
(a) The joint and several judgment against
Appellant and Defenda1'&t, Francis Boydell Goeltz for amottnt paid Pacific
Mutual Life Insurance Co. in satisfaction of the 1936 1nortgage is proper.
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The note (Ex. 22 P) is a joint and several obligation
of Appellant and Defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz
(Sec. 41-1-18 (7), Utah Code Ann. 1953). Respondent
by subrogation succeeded to all rights of the owner of
the note (Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co.) and is
therefore entitled to a joint and sever.al judgment against
the maker for the amount ($3,224.41) paid by Respondent in satisfaction thereof, together with interest at
4¥2% per annum from Feb. 1, 1953-the date to which
interest has been paid. No costs or attorneys fees are
included in this judgment.
(b) The several judgment against defendant,
Francis Boydell Goeltz, is proper.

The defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, is alone
liable on the 1948 note and mortgage for the amounts
specifically set forth in Point V. 2. Attorneys fees and
costs must be chargeable against him only. From the
total amount due on the 1948 mortgage there was deducted the amount of $3,224.41, for \Yhich Respondent
sucures judgment against Appellant and s.aid defendant,
jointly and severally. The balance is charged against
Francis Boydell Goeltz alone. The Court in its equitable
powers had the right and duty to 1nake this division
and apportionment.
(c) The Court ~ra.s 'requ.ired to order the
Htortgaged pre nz ise s to be sold f-irst to
satisfy the joint and se·veral judgtnent
against Appellant and defendant, Fra·ncis B oydell Goeltz.

Respondent, under its subrogation to the rights of
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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. under the 1936 mortgage, proceeded in the same manner as the Insurance
Company would have done in foreclosing this mortgage.
The 1936 mortgage was a first and prior lien on the
mortgaged premises and since Appellant and defendant,
Francis Boydell Goeltz, were jointly and severally liable
thereon, it was proper and necessary to order sold all
of their interests in the mortgaged premises as they
existed on the date the 1936 mortgage was executed.
The Court had no alternative except to order that this
sale be held first, with the same consequences as would
have resulted had the Insurance Company obtained the
judgment and was the successful mortgagee-plaintiff.
It is at this point that the doctrine of Local Realty
Co. vs. Lundquist, supra, becomes of extreme importance.
According to this decision, the effect of a Sheriff's sale
in Utah is not to vest the successful bidder at such sale
with legal title to the premises. He secures the right
(equitable in nature) upon the expiration of the period
of redemption, if no redemption is made, to the Sheriff's
deed. It is this deed which conveys the ti~l~ to the purchaser-not the certificate of sale. The legal title remains in the judgment debtor or succe·ssor in interest
with the right of possession, rent free, during the period
of redemption. The right to redeem from the sale is in
the debtor or successor in interest exclusively when no
judgment creditor or junior mortgagee is involved (Rule
69 f (1), U.R.C.P.), and under Rule 69 f (5), supra, the
term "judgment debtor" includes "successor in interest."
(Bateman v. Kellog supra) (The California statute as
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to redemption reads exactly as Rule 69 f (5).)
When the Sheriff's sale under this provision of the
instant judgment is held, the successful bidder will receive a certificate of sale, but will not at that time acquire
legal title to the premises. The legal title will remain
in the judgment debtors (the Goeltz's) or their "successor in interest." The Appellant remained the owner
of an undivided one-half interest in the premises. The
deed to Davis and from Davis to Appellant did not
alter this interest. Appellant acquired by the Davis
deed (.and the decree of March 31, 1952) the interest
of defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz. As to him and
his interest in the premises, Appellant was a "successor
in interest". The provision of the judgment under consideration does not and cannot in any respect impair
or limit the right of redemption. The right of redemption under this f'ir st sale will be vested in Appellant and
she alone has the right to redeem as defendant, Francis
Boydell Goeltz, transferred all of his interest in the
premises to Appellant and there are no judg1nent creditors or junior n1ortgagees. It 'vill be noted that the doctrine of Local Realty Co. \Yas approved in the subsequent
decision of Layton vs. Layton) supra. A deficiency judgment, joint .and several, against Appellant and Francis
Boydell Goeltz, is proper inasn1uch as they are jointly
and severally liable on the 1936 note (Exs. 22 P, 23 P).
(d) The cou.rt correctly ordered tlzat a
secon.d and subsequent sale be held
covering the 'undz~vided o-ne-half inte·rest
of defendant, F1·ancis Boydell Goeltz, in
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the mortgaged premises, other than the
interest of said defendant sold in the
first sale.
Keeping in mind (.a) that when the defendant,
Francis Boydell Goeltz, executed the 1948 note and mortgage (Exs. 9 P, 10 P, 11 P) the title to the mortgaged
premises was vested in Appellant and said Goeltz as
joint tenants, and (b) that Respondent's rights under
said note and mortgage must be deter1nined by the status
of the title on the date of execution and delivery of said
note .and mortgage, it is manifest that the interest of
said defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, was burdened
and was subject to the lien and claim of said 1948 mortgage when acquired by Appellant under decree of March
31, 1952, and deeds issued pursuant thereto. It has
been previously demonstrated that Francis Boydell
Goeltz had the clear legal right to mortgage his interest,
as joint tenant, in the premises to Respondent. The
Appellant could not prevent such action. Therefore,
Respondent acquired a lien on his interest, subject to
the lien and claim of the 1936 mortgage. As between
him and Respondent and as between him and Appellant
he owned and held an undivided one-half interest. As
to one and another .and as to third parties, joint tenants
are seized of equal undivided interests in the property
(American Law of Property, Vol. II, Sec. 6.1).
The authorities cited above hold that a severance of the joint tenancy is effected by the act of one
joint tenant mortgaging his interest to a third person
and thereby the joint tenancy is converted into a tenancy
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In common. Under this theory when Francis Boydell
Goeltz executed and delivered November, 1948 mortgage
he effected a seveTance of the joint tenancy estate to the
extent of the mortgage lien (Wilkins vs. Young supra)
and a tenancy in common of the mortgaged property resulted. Respondent thereby became mortgagee of his
undivided one-half interest therein. Even if this theory is
not adopted, the 1948 mortgage created a lien on
all of the interest in the n1ortgaged premises owned
and held by the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz,
at the date thereof, and that interest was an undivided
one-half interest. Under the doctrine of the Local Realty
Co., the legal title to the premises, after the first sale
will remain in Appellant: an undivided one-half interest
in her own right under the Bronson deed .and an undivided one-half interest as the grantee of defendant,
Francis Boydell Goeltz. I-Iowever, the undivided one-half
interest coming to Appellant from Francis Boydell
Goeltz will be subject to the lien of the 1948 mortgage
and it is this interest which will be reached by the
second sale. Upon this seco,nd sale there "~ill remain
jn Appellant the full right of redemption fro1n the
same as "successor in interest" of the judgn1ent debtor,
Francis Boydell Goeltz. (Rule 69 f (1) l"Tt. R.C.P.;
Bate1nan vs. l{ellog, supra). It "'"ill be observed that the
Appellant retains eon1pletely the exclusive right of redemption fron1 this second sale as there are no judg1nent
ereditors or junior n1ortgagees, and defendant, Francis
Boydell Goeltz, by virtue of the decree of March 31,
1952, and deeds executed pursuant thereto 'YHS divested
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of all of his interest in the premises.
(e) Exercise of statutory rights of redemption.

The right of redemption in U t.ah is, of course, of
statutory origin, even though it is now incorporated
in the Rules of Civil Procedure. A judgment debtor or
redemptioner must bring himself within the classes
favored by Rule 69 f (1). Appellant is obviously within
the class designated "judgment debtor". After the first
foreclosure sale Appellant has the exclusive right to
redeem from that sale. If and when she makes this
redemption the effect of the sale will be terminated and
she will be restored to her former estate. 'The authorities
cited in (c) supra teach that the subordinate mortgage
lien (1948 mortgage) held by Respondent will not be divested or destroyed by reason of the redemption by
the judgment debtor or assigns of the property from
a sale under a prior lien (the 1936 mortgage). The lien
under the 1948 mortgage is revived and becomes effective and may be enforced. The result is that Appellant,
after redemption from the first sale, holds an undivided
one-half interest in the property, free and clear of any
lien. (This undivided one-half interest was her own
and was not subjected to the lien of the 1948 note and
mortgage because she did not execute them.) However,
the undivided one-half interest which Appellant derived
from defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, was subject to
the lien of the 1948 mortgage because said defendant
while owning the same voluntarily mortgaged it. Respondent therefore is free to resort to this interest to satisfy
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its claim under the 1948 mortgage. As above shown
Appellant can redeem from this second sale (and she
is the only person who can effect redemption) and
thereby restore to herself the title to the entire property.
(f) Disposition

of surplus arising from

sales.

The principal argument of Appellant against the
validity and correctness of the judgment as it pertains
to the foreclosure sale appears to be centered about
the disposition of .any surplus money which may arise
from such sales. Such surplus must be paid into court
to await the order of the court (R 198, R 201). There
are no judgment creditors or junior mortgagees involved,
and defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, has conveyed
all of his interest in the mortgaged premises to Appellant. Manifestly Appellant and only Appellant will be
entitled to .any surplus funds arising from the sales.
(Am. Jur. Mortgages, \Tol. 37, Sec. 873, pg. 249)

PART B

ANALYSIS OF APPELLANT'S LEGAL
AUTHORITIES AND DEMONSTRATION OF
ERRORS IN ARGUMENT
Respondent hereinafter presents its interpretation
and applieation of the legal authorities cited by .L£\.ppellant, and demonstrates the errors and defects in the
theories and argument of Appellant. (The Points hereinafter indicated refer to Appellant's Points set forth
in her brief.)
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POINT I.
Stockyards National Bank, etc. vs. Bragg (1926)
67 Utah 60, 245 Pac. 966.
The contention of Appellant that this case falls
within the doctrine of the above decision is based upon
a clear misunderstanding of the application of the rule
there announced. There was no evidence adduced in
the Bragg case on the question as to whether the adults'
mortgage was given only on the condition that a valid,
binding mortgage would be given by the guardian of
the minors. The issue was decided on the pleadings
(245 Pac. 975) The order of the Supreme Court remanded the action for a new trial with leave to the
plaintiff to amend its complaint so as to be able to try
on the merits the question as to conditional delivery
of the adults' mortgage. The situation thus developed
was finally elucidated by the Supreme Court in the
case of Shibata vs. Bear River State Bank, 115 Utah
395, 205 Pac. (2nd) 253, decided in 1949. The plaintiff
in that case had signed the note and mortgage involved,
both in the capacity as adminstratrix of her husband's
estate and as an individual. At page 253 of 205 Pac.
(2nd) the court wrote :
"Having decided the note and mortgages
were invalid and not binding on the estate, the
question remains as to whether they were evidence of a valid obligation of appellant, personally. The officer of the bank who negotiated the
loan testified that appellant was requested to
sign personally as well as in her representative
capacity upon the advice of the estate's attorney.
He also testified that the bank would not have
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made the loan unless the interests of all concerned were included. The facts here are somewhat similar to the situation in the Stockyards
case, supra. There the plaintiff, who was the
obligee, pleads that its assignor agreed to extend
the time of a past due obligation only on condition
that the interests of both adults and· minors in
certain Salt Lake City property were validly
pledged as additional security for the payment of
such obligation. In answer to this pleading the
adult owners of the interests in the additional
security specifically alleged that they delivered
their note and mortgage pledging their interest
in the additional security only on condition that
the interests of the minors in that security were
validly pledged for that purpose. They further
alleged that the interests of the minors in that
property were not validly pledged and therefore
they were also not bound thereby. No evidence
was introduced on this question but the trial court
on these pleadings, or so its findings were construed by this court, found that the note and mortgage of the adults 'vere delivered conditionally
upon the validity of the pledge of the interests
of the minors in the additional security. The trial
court held that the n1inors' interests in that property were validly pledged and ordered the Inortgage foreclosed. But this court reversed that
holding, disn1issing the action as to the minors,
and ,also said that on those pleadings and findings
the adults 'vere entitled to a judgment in their
favor, but ren1anded the n1atter for further hearing as to the adults \Yith per1nission for the plaintiff to an1end its pleading.
In remanding the ease for a further hearing
with leave to a1nend, the court apparently acted
in accord vvith the equities and the probable facts
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of the case. It is hard to believe that a person
in the business of loaning money would actually
extend the time for payment of an overdue obligation and advance additional money thereon, at
a time when the existing security was apparently
insufficient upon the delivery of notes and mortgages pledging additional property for the security of such loan, with the understanding that the
delivery of such notes and mortgages, even as
to the adult mortgagors, w.as conditional upon the
validity of the pledge of the interests of the
minors in the additional security. Certainly the
obligee would not agree to a proposition that
would render the obligation of the adults a nullity
merely because the obligation of the minors turned
out to be invalid.
In the instant case, the evidence is clear that
the b.ank would not have made the loan unless
it thought every one's interest in the land was
validly pledged. But it does not follow that the
delivery of the note was accepted by it conditionally on the entire obligation being valid nor
does it prove a conditional delivery of the note
and mortgage on the part of Mrs. Shibata. The
fact that an obligee insists upon having the benefit of all parties interested in the property hypothecated, does not tend to prove that the obligors
agreed to be ob.ligated upon condition that all
were obligated or none. Mrs. Shibata understood
that she was mortgaging her property to help
her son on his loan with the bank. As f.ar as
she personally is concerned there is no evidence
that she would not have executed the mortgages
unless the estate was also obligated. She did not
so contend nor plead. She merely pleaded that
she did not understand that she was signing real
property mortgages and thought th.at she was
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only signing crop mortgages. The court found
the evidence against her on this fact. From a
reading of the record we cannot say that its findings were unreasonable or not in accord with the
evidence. It follows, therefore, from what we have
said that the obligation of Mrs. Shibata, personally, is valid and is binding upon her interest
in the real property." (Emphasis supplied.)
The instant case is manifestly within the rule of
the Shibata case. To paraphrase the court's statement
italicized in the above quotation: the fact that Respondent insisted upon having the interests of both Mr. and
Mrs. Goeltz in the property hypothecated does not tend
to prove that ~Ir. Goeltz agreed to be obligated upon
condition that 1Irs. Goeltz was obligated. In t~s connection it should be noted that in his answer (R. 19, 20)
Mr. Goeltz admits he executed and delivered the 1948
note and mortgage in favor of Respondent. 'There is
not a line of evidenee in the case that ~Ir. Goeltz conditioned his execution of the 1948 note and mortgage
upon Respondent securing a valid note and n1ortgage
from l\1 rs. Goeltz.
Further Appellant is by this argun1ent attempting
to use a defense \vhieh belongs exclusiYely to l\Ir. Goeltz.
When she denied her signature on the 19-±S note, nlortgage and agree1nent her defense stopped. It is none of
her concern as to \vhether ~Ir. Goeltz delivered the
note and 1nortgage on eondition ..._-\.ppellant executed .and
delive1·ed saHle. l-Ie says he did not, but adn1its they
are hif' binding obligations. That ends the 1natter. Not
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only do the facts, themselves, deny Appellant's contention, but also the law is against her.

Zinkeison vs. Lewis, 63 Kansas 590, 66 P.ac. 644,
does not hold that the mortgage to which the husband
forged his wife's name was void as to the husband. It
sustains the plaintiff's right to be subrogated to the
rights of holders of prior liens which were p.aid with
plaintiff's money. The court said:
"The right of subrogation, however, is not
founded alone on the notes and mortgages, but
is founded on all the facts and circumstances
which give rise to the claim of subrogation." (66
Pac. 646)
See also Kuske vs. Staley, 138 Kansas 169, 28 Pac. (2nd)
728, wherein the Zinkeison decision is cited in support
of the right of subrogation even in a case where the
mortgage is wholly void because of the forgery of the
signature of the lone mortgagor.

Serial Building and Loan .Assn. v. Eberhardt, 95
N. J. Eq. 607; 124 Att. 56:
This decision does not in any respect deal with the
validity of .a mortgage which was executed by the husband but not by the wife. It affirms the right of the
mortgagee of said mortgage who advanced money to pay
off a prior existing mortgage to be subrogated to the
valid lien of such prior mortgage. The Court declared:
"It would be a most inequitable decision that
would declare dissolved the lien upon the property
in which she (the wife) clairns an inchoate right
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ation which she and her husband had received
upon a valid instrument which no longer exists
through no fault of the complainant whose money
she had enjoyed."

Davis vs. Pugh, 81 Ark. 253, 99 SW 78, affirms the
doctrine of subrogation in a case where the holder of
a mortgage not signed by a wife pays a prior mortgage.
This decision in fact holds that the note signed by the
husband alone secured by the subsequent mortgage (the
signature of the wife thereto not being genuine) was
effective to toll the statute of limitations.
"Appellants insist that the note secured by
the old mortgage is barred by the statute of limitation, and that the right of subrogation is also
barred. It is sufficient in answer to this contention, to say that the debt was kept alive by the
new note executed by Davies, the debtor."

Carey vs. Hart, 208 Alaba1na 316, 94 Southern 298.
The wife's signature was not forged. The mortgages
were. void "for the reason that they 'vere not signed
and separately ackno"\vledged by the wife as the Constitution and statute of this State require in the case of
conveyance of hon1estead." A Constitutional and statutory mandate voided the Inortgage. Forgery of the 'vife's
signature w.as not involved in the ease.
Home OuJners Loan {Jorporation l,S. Papara, 241
Wis. 112, 3 N\V (2nd) 730, does not declare that the
n1ortgage in favor of H.O.L.C. (the proceeds of which
were used to pay a prior 1nortgage and delinquent taxes)
was void as to the executing tenant in common. Rather
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it sustains the right of subrogation against co-tenants
who did not execute the H.O.L.C. mortgage and also
against the claim of dower of the wife of the executing
tenant. (This decision is of particular interest in connection with appellant's claim of negligence on part of
Respondent. See Appellant's Point II).

Kaminskas v. Capanskis, 369 Ill. 566, 17 NE (2nd)
558, upholds the right of subrogation against the inchoate dower claim of the wife of the mortgagor who
did not sign the refunding mortgage. The validity of
the refunding mortgage was not in issue except as to
its effect upon the wife's right of dower. It was not void.
Hall vs. Marshall, 139 Mich. 123, 102 NW 658, upholds the right of subrogation in favor of a refunding
mortgage against the claim of mortgagor's widow that
she held a homestead in the mortgaged premises. The
wife did not execute the refunding mortgage. By a
Michigan statute a mortgage on a homestead was void
if not executed by both husband and wife. The court
held that the evidence did not establish that the widow
held a homestead in the mortgaged premises.
K rost v. K ieg ,____________________ Mo. ____________________ , 46 SW

(2nd) 866. Although the refunding notes and mortgage
were spurious and forged, and therefore void, the court
allowed the intervenor which held these void notes and
mortgage to be subrogated to rights under a prior valid
mortgage. The refunding notes were void because the
signatures of both mortgagors had been forged. There
was no valid signature on the1n.
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POINT II
Home Owners Loan Corporation vs. Papara, 241
Wis. 112, 3 NW (2nd) 730. A quotation from the
opinion will suffice :
"Respondent argues that the doctrine of subrogation is inapplicable in this case by reason of
the negligence on the part of the plaintiff in
failing to take steps to obtain a properly executed
mortgage. Even in the case of negligence, however, one who is not a volunteer is entitled to
equitable assignment in the absence of intervening equities. Iowa County Bank vs. Petty, 1927,
192 Wis. 83, 91, 92, 211 N\V 134, 137 : '* * * From
the very nature of this doctrine of subrogation
its mantle must many times, like the garment of
charity, cover and wipe out a number of sins
of omission or co1nn1ission. The doctrine of subrogation rests upon the theory of unjust enrichment * *
In the instance case those having an
interest in the property, Tony's wife and cotenants, as well as Tony, alike received the benefits of the H.O.L.C. loan, the payment of an
existing n1ortgage valid as against their interest
* * * ; and none of the1n has changed nor been
induced to change his position by reason of the
satisfaction of Building Loan ~-\.ssociation Inortgage. * * * In this situation any negligence on
the part of plaintiff in failing to safeguard
against any defeets in the execution of the mortgage cannot bar it fron1 the right of subrogation."
>)(:.'

Horne Owners Loan Corporation vs. Collins, 120
N. J. Eq. 266, 18-l: . .-\.tl. 6~1.
N egligenee on the part of the n1ortgagee in guarding
against defects in execution of his 1nortgage will not
bar him fron1 the right of subrogation to valid prior
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liens which were paid with proceeds of his mortgage.

Hughes v. Thomas, 131 Wis. 315, 111 N.W. 474,
11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 74
The negligence of the mortgagee (the proceeds of
his mortgage . #ere
.
used to pay a prior valid mortgage)
in securing only the signature of the life tenants to
his mortgage, did not bar his right of subrogation.
The question as to whether the negligence of the
person advancing funds used to discharge a prior lien
can arise only when there are intervening liens. There
were no intervening liens in this case. (Ex. 2 P). Appellant has, therefore, misapplied the doctrine of negligence.
Even where there is an intervening lien subrogation js
allowed. (Am. Jur. Vol. 50-Subrogation, Sees. 107-109,
pgs. 750-752.) Oppositely the rule is clearly established
that
"}ifere negligence of the one seeking subrogation in failing to procure a properly executed
mortgage will not, at least in the absence of
intervening equities, defeat his right to subrogation." (Am. Jur. Vol. 50, Sec. 95, pg. 744)

POINT III
41 O.J.S. Sec. 251, p. 735
"With some qualifications, the general rule
is that property purchased with money from a
wife's separate estate beco1nes her separate prop.,.
erty, and as such is not liable to her husband's
creditors for his debts, even though the property it taken in the joint names of husb.and and
wife or in the husband's name, in the absence of
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a showing of the wife's intention to make a gift
to him."
The following decisions are cited by the editor of
the above excerpt supporting the rule there elucidated:

Gooch vs. Weldon Bank & Trust Co., 176 N.C. 213,
97 S.E. 53. This was an action between the wife and
the husband's administrator wherein the wife asserted
that the deceased husband had taken possession of and
managed her separate estate, selling certain property
and reinvesting the proceeds. The rights of third persons were not concerned. The court rightfully upheld
the wife in her contention, as the North Carolina Constitution had emancipated married women and they retain title to their own separate property upon marriage.
Commercial Bldg. Co. vs. Parslozc, et al., 93 Florida
143, 112 Southern 378 is another case cited in support
of the above quotation from C.J.S. This "~as a direct
attack by re1naindern1en ( t\YO of who1n were married
women) against the ultin1ate grantee of the life tenant
who had asserted complete and exclusiYe O\Ynership of
a parcel of land under the '"ill of her father which
devised to her a life estate "Tith ren1ainder on her death
to nephews and nieces. t\YO of \Yhonl \Yere the n1arried
plaintiffs. The eourt recognized the ownership under
~-,lorida's constitution of the separate property by the
two 1narried ('von1en) re1naindern1en and held that because of their en1ancipation under the Florida la\Y they
were guilty of laches in not proseeuting their suit earlier
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serted a title antagonistic to them. This was a "straight
line" attack on the title of defendants who were not third
parties dealing with the title but were direct ultimate
grantees of the premises from the life tenant.

Kranjcec vs. Be.limat, 114 Montana 26, 132· P.ac.
(2nd) 150. It will suffice to quote from the decision
itself to prove its irrelevancy in this case :
"We think that if the plaintiff had sho\vn
that the wife's permitting the title to the property
to remain in the husband had injured the plaintiff he might have been entitled to prevail under
the rule followed in such cases as Terrill V8.
Wheeler-Motter Thier. Co. 147 Okla. 77, 294 P.a,~.
644 and War Finance Corp. vs. Erickson, 171
Minn. 276, 214 N.W. 45, but no such showing was
made here although fraud was alleged. * * * nor
is there any S'Ltg gestion that the plaintiff was
misled and extended credit to her husband by
reason of the title to the lots being in the husband
at any time." (Emphasis supplied.)
Roberts vs. Farley, 290 Ky. 516, 161 SW (2d) 930
follows the exact pattern of the Montana case summarized above. The executing creditor of the husband extended no credit to him on the strength of the belief
that the husband owned the automobile which was in
fact owned by the wife.
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Beagles, 333 Mo. 568,
62 SW (2d) 800 is an example of the decisions which
are cited in support of the quotation from C.J.S., supra.
This case holds that a married woman in Missouri under
the emancipation act can convey her separate property
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without the consent or signature of the husband so as to
bar his claim of courtesy.
If Appellant's counsel in the instant case had continued his study of 41 C.J.S.-Husband and Wife-and
had turned to Sec. 267, pg. 747 of the same volume he
would have found this statement of the law:
"Where the wife has permitted the husband
to hold title to her separate property, or deal
with it as his own, she is estopped to claim it
ag.ainst persons who have extended credit to, or
otherwise dealt with the husband in reliance on
his apparent ownership."
The principle thus set forth in confirmed in Terrell
vs. Wheeler-Matter Mer. Co. and War Finance Corp.
vs. Erickson cited in K ranjcec v. Belimak, supra. The
Terrell case (per syllabus by the Court) holds:
"Where a married wo1nan permits title to
her land to remain in her husband's name for
such length of time and under such circumstances
and \vith knowledge actual and constructive of
such facts as "~ould n1ake it inequitable for her
to assert her rights, she \vill be estopped as against
the right of her husband's creditors, \vho, without negligence and \Vhile in good faith, \Vere liTISlead there by to his da1nage in the extension of
credit to the husb.and. ~,
The War Finance Corporation ease, referred to
supra contains the follo\ving congent declaration:
''The case is that of a trusting \Yife 'vho has
long pern1itted her husband to 1nanage as his
own her property, to hold himself out to the business \Vorld as the o\vner of it and \vho has been
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satisfied with that appearance of things until
beset by financial reverses. Then ,as to those who
have relied upon the apparent condition of things,
it is too late for the wife to assert her separate
ownership. 12 R.C.L. 599."
This rule applies on a foreclosure of a mortgage where
the mortgagee relied upon the husband's treatment of
the property as his own. (Rathbone v. Rathbun, 35 SW
(2d) C~io. App.) 38.
In addition to the C.J.S. citation ( 41C. J.S. Sec..
251, p. 735) Appellant cites the following decisions in
support of Point III: Wallace vs. Riley, 2·3 Cal. App.
(2nd) 669, 74 Pac. (2nd) 800; Long v. Duprey, 52 NY
(2nd) 93 (sic); and Moskowitz vs. Marrow, 251 NY ~380,
167 NE 506. These cases interpret and pass upon California's and New York's statutes governing so called
"joint tenancy" bank accounts. The parties thereto were
either the original tenants or the executor or administrator of the deceased "tenant" and the surviving tenants.
In such actions evidence as to the "arrangements" between the joint owners other than evidenced by the bank
deposit agreement was held admissible under the statutes.
Manifestly the decisions have no relevancy in the instant
case, inasmuch as they involve inter sese quarrels between
the tenants or between a surviving tenant and the deceased tenant's personal representative.
POINT IV.
O'Reilly vs. McLean, 84 Utah 551, 37 Pac. (2d) 770
and Meagher vs. Dean, 97 Utah 173, 91 Pac. (2nd) 454,
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treat of facts which put a grantee or mortgagee on notice
as to defects in title to real property being purchased
by him or mortgaged to him. The effect of actual notice
of existence of a prior mortgage was considered in the
0' Reilly decision and of possession by a third person
in the M ea_qher case. They have no bearing on the present
litigation because (a) Respondent is asserting no claim
through the unauthorized signatures of Appellant; (b)
if there were negligence on the part of Respondent in
failing to safeguard against defects in execution of the
1948 mortgage, this fact cannot bar its right of subrogation under the 1936 mortgage owned by Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Con1pany (see authorities cited supra)
and (c) the defendant, Francis Boydell Goeltz, was on
date of the 1948 mortgage a joint tenant of the mortgaged premises "\vith ~Irs. Goeltz and therefore was
equally in possession of the premises \vith her.

'T

POIXT
Fidelity Trust and Sarings Bank rs. Willianzs, 285
Ill. App. 139, NE (2nd) 739~ den1onstrates the established
rule of law that ·•retention of possession by the grantor
of the property conveyed is notice of his or her interest
in the property, and to those clai1ning under the grantee".
It has no bearing on this case for three reasons: (a)
Respondent's right to be subrogated to the rights of
the Pacific l\lutual Life Insurance Con1pany under the
rnortgage of 1936 is based upon a Inortgage aclmowledged
by Appellant to have been executed by her; (b) the
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tiation of the 1948 mortgage was in and the premises
were occupied jointly by Appellant and her husband,
Francis Boydell Goeltz, and had been since the time it
was acquired by them from the Bronsons, and (c) Respondent claims no rights in the mortgaged premises
under the unauthorized signature of Appellant on the
1948 note, mortgage and agreement.
POINT VI
Respondent has heretofore demonstrated that it is
entitled to be subrogated to the rights of Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. under the 1936 mortgage. Under
Point II, Part A, it has discussed the case of Martin
vs. Hickenlooper, supra. The assertion of Appellant that
she must have agreed to allow Respondent to be subrogated to the rights of the 1936 mortgage is, of course,
erroneous as the authorities clearly prove. Hickenlooper
does not sustain such position. In all of the "wife forgery" cases there was obviously "non-agreement" by
the wife. The modern and enlightened doctrine of subrogation is not based on contract, but
"Being founded on principles of natural
reason and justice, and being one of benevolence
of the law, it is a highly f.avored doctrine, and' one
which has been most liberally dealt with in the
courts. Perhaps no doctrine of equity jurisprudence is more beneficial in its operations, and
perhaps none stands in higher favor." (Am. Jur.
-Subrogation-Val. 50, Sec. 15, pg. 693)
Hickenlooper allowed subrogation against Martin, a.
junior mortgagee. It was in this connection that the court
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discussed the question of subrogation on the part of the
refunding mortgagee, and even then concluded that
"Indiligence in searching the record will not
prevent equity from applying the doctrine unless
it is culpable or unjustifiable negligence. * * * ."
(59 Pac. (2nd) 1152)
In connection with Hickenlooper, Appellant has cited
two other c.ases of which brief mention will be made. The
first is
McCollarn v. Lark, 187 Ga. 292; 200 S.E. 276, recognizes the right of subrogation by a refunding mortgagee
even against an intervening lien. There was no issue of
negligence of the refunding mortgagee raised in this
case. Involved was the right of subrogee to claim superior
legal position against a lien \Vhich in previous litigation
had been declared junior to the lien to \vhich the refunding mortgagee succeeded.
The second case cited is Wilkin v. Gibson, 113 Ga.
290; 38 SE 37 4, vvhich involves the rights of a junior
lienor against a refunding n1ortgagee. Stated otherwise,
the junior lienor clain1ed that the refunding n1ortgagee
was negligent. The discussion of the Court involved this
issue. It is obvious the c.ase has no application. No intervening or junior lienor is present in the instant case.
POINT VII
Appellant has hereinbefore fully discussed the
method and order of sale of the mortgaged property
under Part A, P0int \r-Form and Requirements of
Judgment.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully submits that it has demonstrated that the trial court committed no error in its
disposition of this action and that the judgment entered
by it should be affirmed with costs against Appellant.

FRANKLIN RITER
Attorney for Respondent
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